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1. Introduction 
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Imperfectivity, understood as a semantic notion, has been described in the 
informal literature on tense and aspect as expressing the idea that an event, state, 
or habit is ongoing. For instance, the English progressive sentence in ( 1 )  says that, 
at the time when I saw Mary, there was an ongoing event of her crossing Vassar 
Street, and the ' simple present' sentence in (2) says that Mary is currently in the 
habit of smoking: 
( 1 )  Mary was crossing Vassar Street (when I saw her). 
(2) Mary smokes. 
In an interval-based semantics, the intuitions mentioned above can be 
formalized by using the relation of temporal inclusion. According to this view, 
someone who uttered ( 1 )  would assert that the time at which I saw Mary is 
included in a time interval at which she crossed Vassar Street. Similarly, someone 
who uttered (2) would assert that the utterance time is included in an interval 
corresponding to the duration of a habit of Mary smoking. But what does it mean 
for a time interval to be an interval at which Mary crosses the street? And what 
exactly constitutes a habit of Mary smoking? Suppose we answer the first 
question by saying that an interval at which Mary crosses the street is an interval 
corresponding to a complete event of Mary crossing the street, beginning when 
she is on one side of the street and starts crossing, and finishing only when she 
gets to the other side. Then, we would face the problem of explaining why a 
sentence like (3) below is judged true, when uttered at a time right after Mary 
started crossing the street, despite the fact that she never got to the other side: 
(3) Mary was crossing Vassar Street, when a bus hit her. 
A way out of this puzzle is to introduce a modal component as part of the 
meaning of progressive sentences with the effect that the utterer does not commit 
himself to the existence in the actual world of a complete event of the sort 
described by the sentence.  A proponent of this view is then left with the task of 
spelling out what kind of modality is involved in these sentences. 1 
What about habituals? I should say from the beginning that I will only be 
dealing here with what I will call 'simple habituals' . Habituality has often been 
discussed in connection with issues related to the expression of genericity in 
natural languages, the former being considered as a special case of the letter (see 
Krifka et al . ( 1995), Cohen ( 1999), Greenberg (2003), inter alia, for discussion) . 
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A common view is that habitual sentences are interpreted as tripartite structures 
involving a silent habitual (or generic) operator with a universal, or quasi­
universal, quantificational force, whose restrictor is identified with the help of 
adverbial clauses, topic-focus structure, and contextual information, as 
exemplified in (4) below (the sentences in (5) provide informal paraphrases) : 
(4) a. When there is a party, Mary dyes her hair. 
(5) 
b. Mary [writes]F to her mother. [In a discussion about how Mary and 
her mother communicate . ]  
a .  
b.  
Every time there is a party, Mary dyes her hair. 
Every time Mary and her mother communicate, Mary writes to her. 
Simple habituals on the other hand do not come with adverbial clauses, do not 
require any special focus marking, and can be uttered out of the blue and still 
sound natural and informative. Some examples are provided in (6) : 
(6) a. 
b. 
c. 
John smokes. 
Mary dyes her hair. 
Sally jogs. 
For cases like these, it is not clear at all what could play the role of the restrictor 
of the habitual quantifier.2 For instance, there are so many different circumstances 
under which a certain person can smoke, that it seems impossible to identify a set 
of situations without being too vague ( 'every appropriate time to smoke, Mary 
smokes ' )  or just trivial ( 'every time Mary smokes, she smokes ' ) .  One can smoke 
just because he or she feels like it from time to time, or every day at noon, or 
maybe because someone is forcing him or her to do so. It does not matter. A 
sentence like 'Mary smokes' can be uttered without the intention to link situations 
of Mary smoking to any other kind of situation, and a hearer does not feel 
compelled or invited to accommodate any kind of situation either. What seems to 
be at issue here is the existence of situations in which Mary smokes.3 
Suppose then that we answer our second question above about what a 
habit is by saying that a habit of Mary smoking is  a sequence of time intervals at 
which she smokes. A problem arises here that is similar to the one we discussed in 
connection to (3).  Imagine Mary died a couple of minutes after someone had 
uttered (2), and that in fact she used to smoke before she died. One would not 
conclude from the facts that the speaker was wrong when he uttered (2), despite 
the fact that the time of that utterance followed the final time interval at which 
Mary smoked, and therefore was not included within an ongoing sequence of time 
intervals at which Mary smokes. Once again, a way out of this problem is to 
include a modal component in habitual sentences, so that someone who utters (2) 
can avoid committing himself to the existence in the actual world of future events 
of Mary smoking.4 
In this paper, I subscribe to the view that (simple) habitual and continuous 
readings connected with imperfectivity have both a temporal and a modal 
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component. However, I will go further and defend a stronger position, namely, 
that continuous and habitual readings share the same temporal and the same 
modal ingredients . The basis for this unification will be an interval semantics that 
I will develop, which is based on a structured temporal domain containing both 
singular and plural intervals, coupled with a modal semantics along the lines 
developed by Paul Portner for the English progressive (Portner ( 1 998» . At the 
core of the ideas to be presented below is the suggestion that plural intervals are 
the formal counterpart of the notion ' sequence of intervals '  informally employed 
above.s 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I present the relevant 
details of the structured temporal domain I have in mind. In section 3 ,  I suggest 
that verb phrases combine with number morphemes forming constituents denoting 
sets of singular or plural time intervals . In section 4, I discuss the temporal 
component of imperfectivity and propose a unified semantics for continuous and 
habitual readings. In section 5 ,  I analyze some crosslinguistic data involving 
imperfective constructions and argue that the aspectual operators involved in them 
display a sensibility to 'number' (singular/plural) that is very similar to what is 
observed with determiners in the nominal domain. In section 6, I present Portner' s  
work on the modal semantics of progressive sentences in English, and argue that 
it can be extended to habitual sentences. The upshot is that the logical forms 
underlying continuous and habitual readings become identical, modulo the 
number specification of the time intervals involved. Section 7 is a brief summary. 
2. The Algebra of Time Intervals 
The definition of a time interval can be built upon the notion of time point. The 
set of time points together with the relation < (precedence) form what is called a 
dense linear order. A time interval I can be defined as a convex set of time points, 
that is, a set such that for any time points px, Py, pz, if px and py belong to I, and 
Px<Pz<Py, then pz also belongs to l. Intuitively, convex intervals correspond to 
continuous portions in a time line. I call them singular intervals .  In addition to 
singular intervals, I will assume that Dj, the domain of all time intervals, also 
contain plural intervals .  I take the set of plural intervals (lp1) to correspond to the 
set formed by closing off the set of singular intervals (Isg) under union and then 
removing all members of Isg. As a consequence, plural intervals are not convex. In 
fact, they can be viewed as sequences of non-overlapping singular intervals .  This 
is so, because the union of two overlapping convex intervals is also a convex 
interval ,  therefore also a member of Isg, and not of Ipl. As an illustration, consider 
the singular intervals i 1 and h in the diagrams below. 
(7) 
a. [ ] [ ] .. b. [ [ ] ] 
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According to the definition of plural intervals just given, since the union of i 1  and 
iz belongs to Isg in (7b) but not in (7a), it belongs to Ipl in (7a), but not in (7b). 
Once we have assumed the existence of both singular and plural intervals, 
we have to redefine the meaning of certain relations between intervals ,  such as, 
precedence and inclusion, extending them to cases including pluralities . They are 
given below: 
(8) Right Boundary/Left Boundary 
A time point p is the right/left boundary of an interval i iff p belongs to i, 
and for every time point p ', if p '  belongs to i, then p 'S pip S p ' . 
(9) i-precedence 
An interval i i-precedes an interval i '  iff the right boundary of i precedes 
the left boundary of i' . 
( 10) i-inclusion 
An interval i is i-included (Cj) in an interval i '  iff the left boundary of i '  
precedes the left boundary of i, and the right boundary of i precedes the 
right boundary of i' . 
As far as singular intervals are concerned, the definitions above are quite intuitive, 
so the interval corresponding to March/200l i-precedes the interval corresponding 
to Augustl2001 ,  and is i-included in the interval corresponding to the first 
semester of 200 1 .  Now, consider what happens when plural intervals enter the 
picture. Let i 1  correspond to March/2001 ,  iz to August/2001 ,  and h to the plurality 
JanuaryI200l$MayI200 1 .  According to ( 10),  i 1  is i-included in h, since h ' s  left 
boundary precedes i I ' s left boundary, and i I ' s right boundary precedes i3 ' s right 
boundary. Notice that the fact that the time points belonging to i t  do not belong to 
any part of h is irrelevant. Less surprisingly, according to (9), h i-precedes iz, 
since h ' s  right boundary precedes iz' s left boundary. These definitions will 
become relevant when we discuss the semantics of aspectual operators later in the 
paper. 
3. Verb Phrases and Plural Intervals 
In this paper, I will assume a version of an interval-based semantics, according to 
which the denotations of verbs have a temporal argument in addition to whatever 
individual arguments they have in standard logical renditions of verb meaning. I 
will assume that the temporal argument is the outermost one and that after a verb 
combines with its other arguments (if any), the resultant verbal projection (which 
I will label as VP) denotes (a characteristic function of) a set of time intervals .6 
Take, for example, the verb 'dye '  in a sentence like ( 1 1 ) .  According to what I just 
said, we have: 
( 1 1 )  Mary dyed her hair. 
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( 1 2) [dye] = AX .  Ay. At. y dyed X at t 
( 13 )  [ [vp Mary dye her hair]] = At. Mary dye her hair at t 
Now, imagine Mary dyed her hair for the first time three years ago, and after that 
she dyed it twice, one two years ago, and another one last year. Let us call those 
time intervals i I , h, and i3 , respectively. Under this scenario, and assuming sshe 
will never dye her hair again, the denotation of the {bare} VP 'Mary dye her hair' 
would be the set { i I , h, i] } .  
A natural question at this point is whether verb phrase denotations can 
contain pluralities or not. In other words, one could ask whether verb denotations 
allow for pluralities as their temporal arguments or not. My answer is yes .  I 
assume that any verb phrase can have both singular and plural intervals in its 
extension. Thus, in our scenario above where Mary dyed her hair three times in 
the past, and i I , h, and i] are the intervals corresponding to the exact duration of 
the events, if we assume that she will never dye her hair again, a speaker who 
knows the meaning of the verb 'dye ' and is aware of the relevant facts will 
automatically know that ( 14) is true: 
Bare VPs then combine with number morphemes {singular and plural}, whose job 
is to select the relevant members {singular or plural intervals} of the sets denoted 
by these VPs.  
{ 1 5} VPsg = [ sg VP ] vppJ = [ pi VP ] 
( 16) [sg] = AP. At. pet} = 1 & t is singular 
[pI] = AP. At. pet} = 1 & t is plural 
[VPsglpJ] = At. [VP] {t) = 1 & t is singular/plural 
In the scenario above: 
( 17) a. [VPsg] =  { i J ,  h, i] } 
b. [VPpJ] = { i IE9h, hE9i] , hE9i] , hE9hE9i] } 
With this much as background, in the next section, we tum to the role played by 
the aspectual operator responsible for bringing imperfectivity to the meaning of 
the sentences we started with in the introduction. 
4. The Imperfective Operator 
As a starting point, assume that aspectual operators are modifiers in the following 
sense: they are functions taking a set of intervals as their input and returning 
another set of intervals as their output. As far as temporal semantics is concerned, 
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the main job of aspectual operators is the introduction of relations between time 
intervals in the logical representation of sentences (cf. Klein ( 1994)) . In sentences 
with a single layer of aspectuality, these relations hold between the interval 
corresponding to the temporal specification of the clause (pastlpresent!future), 
and an interval belonging to the denotation of the verb phrase. A typical clause 
skeleton will then look like ( 1 8) :7 
( 1 8) [TP T [AspP Asp [VP-sglpl sglpl VP ] ] ]  
I will start by encoding the semantics of  imperfectivity in  a morpheme, 
which I will call Imp. The main job of this morpheme is to introduce the inclusion 
relation between intervals, as shown in the lexical entry in ( 19) :  
( 19) [Imp] = AP<it>. At. 3f : f:::> t & P(t ' )  = 1 
Before looking at a concrete instance of an English sentence containing this 
morpheme, consider the logical forms in (20) and (2 1 ) . :  
(20) [TP pastl [AspP Asp [vP-sg sg [vp John paint the house ] ] ] ]  
(2 1 )  [TP past 1 [AspP Asp [VP-pl pI [vp John paint the house ] ] ] ]  
Now, imagine the following scenario: Last year, John painted his house once 
every month. He always started on the 1 5th and finished on the 17th of each 
month. Call the time intervals within each month at which John painted the house 
i t ,  iz, . . .  , i 1 2 . According to what I said in the previous section, and assuming these 
were the only occasions in which John painted the house, the extension of the 
bare VP in (20) and (2 1 )is (22) : 
Given the semantics of Imp above, the truth-conditions for in (20) and (2 1 )  should 
be as in (23) and (24), respectively: 
(23) [TP] g = 1 iff 3t' : f:::> g( 1 )  & f is singular & PAINT(j,h,t ' )  = 1 
(24) [TP]g = 1 iff 3f : t':::> g( 1 )  & t' is plural & PAINT(j ,h,t ' )  = 1 
Now, assume that Past1 refers to June 16th• Then (20) should be true, since i6, for 
instance, verifies the formula embedded under the existential quantifier in (23) .  
What if Past1 refers to June 20th? Now (20) should be false, since there is no 
interval in the denotation of VPsg that includes June 20t
h• The situation changes 
with (2 1 ) .  If Past1 refers to June 20th, (2 1 )  is true, since i5�i7 , for instance, verifies 
the formula embedded under the existential quantifier in (24). We need to invoke 
a plural interval this time, but that is fine, since the denotation of VPpl includes 
plural intervals .  Finally, if past1 refers to June 1 6th, (2 1 )  is still true, but not 
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because this interval is included in i6, but because it is included in plural intervals ,  
such as isEt>h. The conclusion is that logical forms containing Imp can express not 
only the existence of an on-going event at a certain time, but also the existence of 
on-going sequences of (two or more) events of John painting the house. The 
choice will depend on whether Imp combines with singular or plural VPs. 
One can imagine more specialized versions of Imp, in which this operator 
selects for either sets of singularities (Psg) or sets of pluralities (Pp1) as its first 
argument. 8 As a consequence, only singular or plural intervals are quantified over 
in the logical representations of sentences containing these operators : 
(25) [Impsg] = APsg. At. 3t' : t'::J t & P(t ' )  = 1 
(26) [Impp1] = APpl. At. 3t' : t'::J t & P(t ' )  = 1 
Now, logical forms containing Impsg can only express that an event, but not a 
sequence of events, is ongoing. On the other hand, logical forms with Imppl can 
only express that sequences of events are ongoing. 
My suggestion is that the so-called progressive or continuous readings of 
imperfective sentences are derived from logical forms like (23) ,  and that habitual 
readings are derived from logical forms like (24). Thus, as far temporal semantics 
is concerned, continuous and habitual sentences are nearly synonymous,  their 
logical forms differing minimally, and only with respect to the number 
specification of the VPs that combine with Imp. At this point, I beg the reader to 
disregard issues concerning modality. I will discuss those issues in detail in the 
next section, where I will supplement the meaning of Imp with quantification over 
possible worlds. As will become clear, I will try to argue that both continuity and 
habituality involve the same kind of modality. In this way, what I presented above 
can be seen as a first step towards a unified semantics for the continuous and 
habitual readings associated with imperfectivity. However, before we enter the 
modal domain, I want to present some empirical data illustrating the view I am 
advocating here. 
5. Crosslinguistic Data 
According to what we saw in the previous section, sensitivity to number leads us 
to expect the existence of three different imperfective operators : Imp, Impsg and 
Impp1. Imp combines with both singular and plural VPs;  Impsg combines only with 
singular VPs and ImPpl combines only with plural VPs. The sensitivity to number 
that I am proposing for these temporal operators is similar to what happens in the 
nominal domain, where we find determiners like some, which combines with both 
singular and plural noun phrases ( 'some boy/some boys), every, which combines 
only with singular noun phrases ( 'every boy/*every boys), and all, which only 
combine with plural noun phrases ( , *all boy/*all boys) .  In this section, I argue 
that all three imperfective operators are attested in natural language. 
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Simple present sentences with accomplishments and activities in English 
and Portuguese, as illustrated in (27) below, give rise to habitual readings only, 
suggesting that Imppl , in this case a phonetically null operator, is part of their 
logical forms. 
(27) a. Mary dyes her hair. 
b. A Maria tinge 0 cabelo. 
Simple present sentences in Italian, French and Spanish are ambiguous 
between continuous and habitual readings, suggesting that both Impsg and Imppl 
are available for these languages.9 The same is true of another well-known 
construction in Romance, namely, the past imperfect, as illustrated in (28). 10  
(28) A Maria tingia o cabelo. (port.) 
THE MARY DYE.PAST-IMP THE HAIR 
'Mary was dying/used to dye her hair. ' 
In fact, a similar ambiguity is attested in several other languages as well (Dahl 
( 1985);  Dahl ( 1995)), and, according to what I suggested above, it reduces to the 
possibility of Imp combining with both singular and plural VPSl l . Finally, earlier 
stages of Turkish provide an example of a morpheme instantiating Impsg : 
(29) mektup yazyor 'he is writing letters ' 
According to Dahl ( 1 995 :41 8) ,  "relatively recently, the -yor forms seem to have 
had progressive meaning only." 
In conclusion, the analysis defended here provides a simple account of 
crosslinguistic variation within the domain of imperfectivity, reducing the 
differences to a single parameter related to the 'number' requirements of a 
(existential) aspectual operator. 
6. Imperfectivity and Modality 
In the previous sections, by focusing the discussion on issues concerning temporal 
semantics, I neglected an important component in the meaning of imperfective 
sentences. It is now time to revise it. Let us start by looking at continuous 
readings, exemplified here by the English progressive. I will call the aspectual 
operator present in these sentences Prog. Since, for the moment, we will only be 
dealing with continuous readings, the meaning of Prog will be the meaning we 
assigned to Impsg before. According to the lexical entry of this aspectual operator, 
a sentence of the form [ T Prog VP] entails the existence of a singular time 
interval at which an event of the type described by the VP takes place. However, 
as has been acknowledged in the literature since the seventies, this seems to be 
too strong, as attested by examples like (30) below: 
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(30) John was building a house (when he died). 
(30) can be true even if John has never finished building a house. It seems that it 
is enough that he was in the process of building one for the sentence to be true. 
This intuition is corroborated by examples like the following: 
(3 1 )  John was crossing the street (when a bus hit him) . 
Again, for (3 1 )  to be true, all we have to check is whether or not John had started 
walking toward the other side of the street, when the bus hit him. What is 
interesting about this case is that the sentence can be true even if, when John 
started crossing the street, the likelihood that he was going to finish it was very 
low, for instance, if the traffic was heavy, cars were running fast, and the 
pedestrian light was red. Thus, it appears that external obstacles, no matter how 
likely they are to interfere in the ongoing event, are not taken into account when 
we assess the truth of (3 1 ) .  By external obstacles, I mean people or objects other 
than John and the street he was crossing. 
What happens when an event is interrupted not by an external obstacle, 
but by the limitations of one of the participants of the event? Consider a variation 
of (3 1 )  (due to Fred Landman): 
(32) John was crossing the Atlantic. 
Imagine (32) being uttered five minutes after John started swimming on the West 
Coast of Africa towards the Brazilian Coast on the other side of the Atlantic. This 
sentence is very likely to be judged false, and, apparently, the reason for that is 
the fact the Atlantic is a huge portion of water, and the John that we have in mind 
is probably a normal human being. Since any human being would give up or die 
before being even close to Brazilian waters, the fact that our John had started 
swimming before the reference time (five minutes after he started in the scenario 
above) is not enough to make the sentence true. Contrary to the buses and cars in 
the case of (3 1 ), the relevant obstacle here has to do with John' s  physical 
conditions and, also, the size of the Atlantic. On the other hand, if John is known 
to have supernatural powers, judgments change, and the sentence is considered 
appropriate to describe the situation. These facts tell us that progressive sentences 
with accomplishment VPs can be false, even when the process constituting the 
event being described by the sentence is already going on. 
When animate participants are involved, not only their physical 
conditions ,  but also their mental state seem to matter. Consider (3 1 )  again, but this 
time uttered under different circumstances. Imagine John is standing on one side 
of the street when he sees a one hundred dollar bill right in the middle of the 
street. He then starts walking there to pick up the bill, when a bus comes and hit 
him. (3 1 )  is judged false in this case, and this can only be due to the fact he did 
not intend to cross the street, since apart from that, the scenario is identical to the 
other one we discussed above in connection to the very same sentence. 
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What is needed then is a supplement to our current lexical entry for Prog 
that takes into account the facts discussed above. In this section, I will present 
Paul Portner' s modal analysis of the progressive (Portner ( 1 998)), which has its 
roots in the influential work by David Dowty back in the seventies (Dowty 
( 1 977)). After showing how his analysis of Prog can handle the relevant facts , I 
will argue that habitual readings can be analyzed along the same lines, once we 
maintain the unified temporal treatment of habituals and progressives proposed in 
the previous section. The final result will be a complete unification (temporal and 
modal) between these two notions .  
6. 1 .  Portner (1998): the progressive in modal semantics 
Portner' s  background is Angelika Kratzer' s  semantics for modality (Kratzer 
( 198 1 )) ,  which has three crucial ingredients : a quantifier over possible worlds, a 
modal base, and an ordering source. Given a world w (the world of evaluation), 
the modal base (M) provides a set of propositions M(w), which constrain the set 
of worlds that are being quantified over. Only worlds in which every proposition 
in the set provided by the modal base is true (nM(w)) are relevant for the 
interpretation of the sentence. The ordering source (0) also provides a set of 
propositions (O(w)), a set understood as an ideal according to which worlds can 
be ranked. A world w '  is at least as close to the ideal as world w "  (w '� w ") if, 
and only if, every proposition that is true in w '  is also true in w ". The core feature 
of the proposal is that, when evaluated with respect to a world w, quantification is 
restricted to the worlds belonging to (nM(w)) that are ranked best according to 
O(w) (Best M,O,w). Crucially, choices of modal bases and ordering sources vary 
from context to context, being usually determined by both linguistic and 
extralinguistic material . 
Portner' s  proposal is to analyze the meaning of progressive sentences as 
involving universal modal quantification, along the lines summarized above. The 
question then is what kinds of modal base and ordering sources are involved in 
these sentences. His suggestion is that the modal base is a variety of 
circumstantial one, and that the ordering source is based on the ideal that the 
event described by the sentence (under VP) is not interrupted by any 'outside ' 
factor. Let us consider the example he used to illustrate what he has in mind: 
(33)  Mary was climbing Mount Toby. 
Circumstantial modal bases take into consideration what the relevant facts are in a 
certain context The modal base for (33)  would deliver a set of propositions, 
expressing the relevant facts about Mary' s  current physical and mental conditions 
(her strength, her age, her dispositions, etc . . .  ), Mount Toby' s  physical state (its 
height, its soil, its shape, etc .. ) ,  and also what Mary is doing (Has she started 
climbing MT? Is she heading the right way? Is she lost?). This set might look like 
(34) below: 
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(34) M(w) = { 'Mary is in good physical condition ' ,  'Mary does not give up 
easily' , 'It was raining lightly on Mount Toby at 7 ' , 'Mary was headed the 
right way on the trail at 7 ' , . . .  } 
Given the circumstances above, (33) is intuitively true. However, notice that 
among the worlds in which every proposition in (34) is true, there are worlds in 
which Mary will never manage to climb MT. Think about worlds in which she 
gets eaten by a bear, or in which she slips and gets seriously injured. Things like 
that are not necessarily uncommon when people climb mountains, especially if 
they are not professionals. However, the possibility that these events happen 
seems to be irrelevant when computing the truth-conditions for (34). That is when 
the ordering source enters the scene in Portner' s  analyses . In the case of (34), it 
would look something like (35) :  
(35) O(w) = { 'Mary does not get eaten by a bear' , 'Mary does not slip and hurt 
her ankle' ,  'A surprise summer blizzard does not start on MT' , 'Mary does 
not get lost' , . . .  } 
Together, the propositions in (35) express an ideal set of worlds in which Mary 
encounters no obstacle in her way towards the top of MT. In a sense, in these 
worlds (the worlds in nO(w)), whether or not Mary manages to climb MT 
depends exclusively on how they look like at the relevant time. 
According to (34) and (35),  Best (M, 0, w) contains all the worlds in 
which Mary and Mount Toby are similar to what they are in the actual world at 
the relevant time, and no outside factors like bears, rocks, blizzards interrupt the 
climbing. The idea is that (33) will be true just in case all such worlds are ones in 
which Mary climbs Mount Toby. Under the circumstances in (34), (33)  is 
predicted to be true. On the other hand, if it is snowing heavily on MT, the 
proposition 'It was raining lightly on MT' would be replaced by 'It is snowing 
heavily on Mt' in M(w). Now, Mary could never make it to the top, even if she 
tries hard. In this case, Best (M,O,w) would contain worlds in which Mary does 
not climb MT, and the sentence is predicted to be false. Both predictions are 
borne out. 
At this point, it should be clear how Portner' s  theory could handle the 
puzzling contrast between (3 1 ) and (32) , discussed in the beginning of this 
section. It is clear from what we saw above that both the modal base and the 
ordering source depend on the description of the event under VP. Thus, in the 
case of (3 1) ,  M(w) includes all the relevant facts about John and the street he is 
crossing, whereas in the case of (32), it includes all the relevant facts about John 
and the Atlantic Ocean, including the fact that it is a huge portion of water. In this 
case, even if we restrict attention to worlds in which all potential obstacles for the 
completion of an event of John crossing the Atlantic were removed (no sharks, no 
unexpected storms, etc . . .  ), given John' s  limited physical conditions, and the size 
of the ocean, most, if not all , worlds in this set would be worlds in which he fails 
to cross the Atlantic. Accordingly, the sentence is judged false. In the case of (3 1 ) ,  
i f  the street is an average street, e .g. if i t  is 30 feet large, then this information is 
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part of M(w). Since John will manage to cross the street in all of then, as soon as 
we remove the external obstacles (oncoming buses, cars running fast, etc . . .  ), the 
sentence is predicted to be true, the correct result. 
The new lexical entry for Prog that emerges from this discussion is given 
below12 : 
(36) [Prog] W = A P<w,it>. At. for every world w'  in BEST(M, 0, w, t), there is a 
time interval t' , such that t c t ' ,  and P (w' )(t ' )  = 1 .  
(37) BEST(M, 0, w, t) = the set of worlds w' in nM(w, t) , such that there is no 
world w" in nM(w, t) where w"<O(w,t) w' . 
Notice that the first argument of Prog in (36) is the intension of a VP denotation, a 
function from worlds to sets of time intervals. I also added an extra argument for 
BEST, which captures the fact that the set of propositions delivered by the modal 
base and the ordering source is sensitive not only to the world of evaluation, but 
also to what is usually called the reference time. Modal bases and ordering 
sources change as time goes by. For instance, for a sentence like 'At three 
o'clock, Mary was climbing Mount Toby' ,  what counts as relevant is  not Mary' s 
physical conditions when she was a young child, or how tall Mount Toby was 
during the Paleolithic .  On the contrary, it is their conditions at three o 'clock that 
matters . 
6.2. Integrating habituality into the picture 
According to what I said in previous sections, habitual and continuous readings of 
imperfective sentences share the same temporal semantics. I argued there that the 
difference between those readings come from a difference concerning the 
plurality of the time intervals being quantified over, singular intervals in the case 
of continuous readings, plural intervals in the case of habituals .  We have just seen 
that progressive sentences expressing continuous readings have also a modal 
component. I will now argue that habitual readings share the same modal 
component, thus maintaining the view that continuous and habitual readings have 
the same source (modulo number specification), namely, Imp morphemes :  Imp, 
ImpsG and ImpPL. 
Consider the following scenario: John, who loves soccer, does not live far 
from college, where the only soccer field in the neighborhood is located. He goes 
there regularly to play with his friends. Sentence (38) below is true under these 
circumstances: 
(38) John plays soccer. 
(38) tells us something about John' s  current dispositions. Unless some external 
factor interferes, he will walk to the campus and play soccer again in the future, as 
he has been doing for a while. The proviso 'unless some external factor interferes' 
is crucial since a speaker who utters (38) does not commit himself to the existence 
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of future events of John playing soccer, regardless of what might happen to John. 
Thus, if John suddenly dies before tomorrow morning, of course, he will never 
walk to the campus again, let alone play soccer. Also, if tomorrow John gets a 
message saying that the campus has closed, and that all departments and facilities, 
including the soccer field, are being transferred to another location, which 
happens to be 10 miles away from John ' s  house, he will probably stop playing 
soccer. But these possibilities do not interfere in the truth of (38) .  In assessing the 
truth of (38) ,  we seem to ignore all possible interruptions of a current sequence of 
events of John playing soccer. In fact, sentences like (39) can perfectly be true : 
(39) John used to play soccer, when he died. 
Notice the striking similarity between what we saw before in the case of 
continuous readings of progressive sentences, and what we have just seen above 
with respect to habitual readings . In particular, compare our discussions of (3 1) ,  
'John was crossing the street' ,  and (38). In the former, we discarded all potential 
external obstacles to the completion of a singular event, whereas in the latter we 
discarded all potential obstacles to the continuation of a sequence of events, 
which, according to our previous discussions, is nothing but a plural event. Since 
the singular/plural distinction was factored out from the meaning of Imp, it is 
natural to conclude that the modal component integrated into the meaning of 
ImplProg discussed in relation to continuous readings carries over to the cases 
involving habitual readings as well .  In other words, the logical forms associated 
with continuous and habitual readings of imperfective sentences are identical , 
except for the number specification of the aspectual operator Imp. 
Before I go through the details of these logical forms, and discuss some 
important consequences, let me present another fact that strengthens the parallel 
between continuous and habitual readings . Recall Landman' s  discovery that in the 
case of sentences like (32), 'John was crossing the Atlantic ' ,  which are judged 
false if John is not a superhero, what is crucial is the fact that John ' s  physical 
conditions, and the Atlantic ' s  huge dimensions make it impossible for him to 
cross the ocean, even if we grant that external obstacles are going to be removed. 
Thus, in this case it is not enough that John believes he can cross the Atlantic, and 
intends to do so. The conclusion was that the actual physical features of the 
participants in the events described under VP are also taken into account by the 
circumstantial modal base. Are there similar situations involving habituality? I 
believe there are. Consider the following cartoonlike scenario:  One of the hobbies 
of a certain superhero is to cross the Atlantic to keep his shape. However, 
yesterday night, while he was sleeping, he lost his superpowers forever, and 
became a normal human being. He does not know that, so tomorrow morning he 
will wake up and prepare for his exercise, just like he does every day. Now, 
sentence (40) below is not judged true, despite the fact that the superhero' s  
dispositions have not changed. 
(40) The superhero crosses the Atlantic. 
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As in the previous case, the relevant circumstances here take into consideration 
physical facts about the superhero and the ocean, and that is why the sentence is 
judged false. Thus, we seem to be dealing with the same kind of circumstantial 
modal base that Portner proposed for the continuous readings of progressive 
sentences. 
I will assume that is the case, and propose the (simplified) logical form in 
(4 1 )for the habitual reading of sentence (38): 
(4 1 )  [TP Presj [AspP Imppl [VP-pl pI  [vP John play soccer ] ] ] ]  
The truth-conditions are given below: 
(42) [ TP ] W  = 1 iff for every world w' in BEST(M, 0, w, t), there is a plural 
time interval t ' , such that TV c t' & PLAY_SOCCERG , t ' ) .  
First, imagine (38) uttered at a time before the campus was closed. The set of 
worlds yielded by the circumstantial modal base M at that time would look like 
(43) below: 
(43) M(w, t)  = { John played soccer with his friends several times recently, 
John is in good physical conditions, John intends to play soccer again, 
there is a soccer stadium close to John ' s  house, . . .  } 
(43) contains relevant information about John' s  physical and mental states at the 
utterance time, about the existence of a stadium in the neighbohood, and also 
about past occurrences of John playing soccer. I assume these are the minimal 
relevant circumstances taken into consideration by the modal base in simple 
habitual sentences . What about the ordering source? The propositions in the set 
delivered by the ordering source ° encode the conditions for a sequence of events 
of the type described under VP not interrupt. In our case we have something along 
the lines of (44): 
(44) O(w,t) = { John does not die tomorrow,  John does not get arrested, the 
stadium does not close, . . .  } 
The set BEST (M, 0, w, t) will then consist of the worlds in nM(w,t) which rank 
best according to O(w,t). (42) requires that there be a plural time interval at 
which John plays soccer in all these worlds . This plural interval should include 
the time of utterance. As a result, if John does not happen to be playing soccer 
right at the utterance time, (42) requires the existence of both past and future 
singular intervals at which John plays soccer. In our case, since M(w,t) and O(w,t) 
are consistent, BEST will contain worlds in which John keeps playing soccer. 
Therefore, the existence of future playing events in these worlds is guaranteed. As 
for past events, since the modal base cares about whether or not there were 
previous playing events in the world of evaluation, and in our scenario there were, 
the worlds in BEST are also worlds in which there was at least one event of John 
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playing soccer before the utterance time. Thus, (38) is correctly predicted to be 
true under the circumstances we are considering. Notice that the sentence would 
be false if John had never played soccer before the utterance time. Since M(w,t) 
would contain this information, there would never be a plural interval that 
included the utterance time in the worlds in BEST, at which John played soccer. I 
believe this is correct. If John had never played soccer before the utterance time, 
then (38) is not true. 
Imagine now that John cannot control the movements of his legs anymore 
due to a tragic car accident, and that (38) was uttered after these facts became 
known. This crucial aspect of the new scenario has a direct impact on M(w,t) : 
(45) M(w, t) = { John played soccer with his friends several times recently, 
John cannot move his legs, there is a stadium close to John' s  house, . . .  } 
Given (45), the worlds in BEST are not worlds in which there are future events of 
John playing soccer. As a consequence, they are not worlds in which there is a 
plural interval that includes the utterance time at which John plays soccer. (38) is 
correctly predicted to be false in this case. 
Summarizing, habitual readings of imperfective sentences can be analyzed 
as involving the same kind of modality observed in connection to continuous 
readings. Since their temporal components are also the same, we arrive at a 
unified semantics for the aspectual operators involved in imperfective sentences. 
The origin of the ambiguity lies elsewhere, in the number of the VP-predicate 
with which the operator combines : singular in the case of continuous readings, 
plural in the case of habitual readings . The same is true of the other instances of 
imperfectives that we mentioned before, such as the past imperfect in Romance. 1 3 
7. Conclusion 
This paper was an attempt to provide a unified semantics for continuous and 
(simple) habitual readings of imperfective sentences. Based on a structured 
temporal domain, containing both singular and plural intervals, I argued that the 
only difference between continuous and habitual readings concerns the number 
(singular or plural) of the time intervals that are quantified over in the logical 
form of the sentences. I proposed that the source of imperfectivity is an aspectual 
operator, which introduces existential quantification over time intervals and 
universal quantification over possible worlds . We went through several cases 
suggesting that both readings involve the same kind of modality, one that involves 
a circumstantial modal base and an ordering source based on an ideal in which an 
ongoing event of the kind described by the sentence is not interrupted by external 
factors, as proposed by Portner ( 1 998) for the English progressive. I argued that 
the difference between continuous and habitual readings is related to the fact that 
in the former it is singular 'events ' (more precisely, singular time intervals) that 
are not interrupted, whereas in the latter it is plural ones that are not. I looked at 
different imperfective operators in Romance and English, and concluded we can 
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reduce the difference between them to the number specification restricting the 
kinds of intervals they can quantify over, in a way that is very similar to what 
happens with determiners in the nominal domain. 
Endnotes 
* I would like to express my gratitude to the following people who helped me with 
their comments and criticism during the elaboration of this paper: Kai von Fintel, 
Danny Fox, Elaine Grolla, Irene Heim, Sabine Iatridou, Michael Kenstowicz, and 
Ken Wexler. Special thanks to Irene Heim for support and encouragement. } Dowty ( 1 977), Landman ( 1992), and Portner ( 1998) are among the works that 
have undertaken this task. See also Bonomi ( 1997a) for an event-based analysis 
that share some of the ideas developed by those authors . For a different view on 
the matter, cf. Vlach ( 198 1 ), Bach ( 1986) and Parsons ( 1990) . 
2 But see Krifka ( 1987) and Krifka ( 1988) for suggestions. 
3 The sentences in (6) differ from sentences like 'John sells vacuum cleaners ' or 
'This machine crushes oranges ' ,  which I take to involve tripartite structures, the 
restrictor in this case, being a set of situations pre-specified in a job contract or in 
an owner' s manual for example. 
4 Linking habituality to modality is, of course, not so surprising, since it has often 
been remarked about habitual statements that they convey more than pure 
repetitions of a certain situation. On a pair with generic sentences, they have been 
said to express non-accidental, lawlike statements . See Krifka et al . ( 1 995) and 
references therein. I will return to the modal ingredients of habituals in section 6 .  
5 For different unifying ideas, which I will not be able to review here, see Bonomi 
( 1997b), and Cipria and Roberts (2000). 
6 I will rely on the one-to-one correspondence between sets and their 
characteristic functions, and use the terms interchangeably throughout the paper. 
7 I will follow the tradition inaugurated with Partee ( 1 973) ,  according to which 
tenses are treated as pronouns.  Thus, when not bound by an operator, T nodes 
refer to context salient time intervals. Distinctions among tenses, e .g .  past vs. 
present can be encoded as presuppositions in their lexical entries. Following the 
notational conventions in Heim and Kratzer ( 1998),  lexical entries of tenses 
would look like the following: 
(i) [ past} ] g = g( 1 )  if g( 1 )  precedes the utterance time; and undefined 
otherwise. 
(ii) [ pres } ] g = g( 1 )  if g( 1 )  is the utterance time; and undefined otherwise. 
For our purposes, g can be viewed as a function provided by the context of 
utterance, mapping indices to contextually salient entities. 
8 A parallel with the nominal domain will be discussed in the next section. 
9 I will not discuss simple present sentences with stative predicates, such as 'John 
is sick' . These sentences do not have habitual interpretations .  All they mean is 
that a certain sate holds at the utterance time. One idea that comes to mind is that 
they involve bare VPs directly connected to tense, without mediation of an 
aspectual layer. I will leave these issues for another occasion. For an analysis, see 
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Swart ( 1 998), whose key ingredient is a mechanism of coercion, which inserts a 
habitual (iterative) operator in the logical form of simple present sentences with 
accomplishments and activity predicates, but not with statives . 
1 0 As its name suggests, the past imperfect is an aspectual operator used only in 
combination with the past tense. I will encode this restriction in its lexical entry, 
by means of a logical presupposition (the notation is from Heim and Kratzer 
( 1998» . 
(i) [Past Imp] g = AP<it>. At: t < g(O). ::It' : t '� t & P(t ' ) = 1 
In (i) ,  0 is a designated index, which the assignment g always maps to the 
utterance time. After [Past Imp] combines with its first argument, the result is a 
function from intervals to truth values. The formula after the colon indicates that 
this function is a partial function, only defined for past intervals .  
1 1  The progressive in English and Portuguese also gives rise to continuous and 
habitual readings, although the use of progressive sentences to express habituality 
is limited to recently acquired habits in both languages . As for other Romance 
languages, one finds a lot of dialectal variation concerning geographical and 
social factors . For data and discussion, see Squartini ( 1 998) and the references 
cited there. 
1 2 This is not exactly what Portner gives, since his analysis is couched within an 
event-based framework. 
1 3 With the possible exception of Italian, whose Imperfect has been claimed to 
lack a modal component. Cf. Giorgi and Pianesi ( 1 998) .  
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